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1 Introduction 
 
The exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal trials is a subject 
that frequently evokes a conflict between two equally important societal views. Crime 
control protagonists are repulsed by the acquittal of those who are factually guilty. 
They contend that society pays an excessive price when an accused is acquitted for 
the reason that unconstitutionally obtained evidence, crucial for a conviction on a 
serious charge, has been excluded. The social costs of exclusion are great under 
these circumstances, because a person who is factually guilty has not been brought 
to book. By contrast, fundamental rights advocates frown upon a conviction based 
on evidence procured by police conduct that unlawfully encroaches upon the 
constitutional rights of accused persons. In other words, there is a tension between 
the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system and the protection of 
fundamental rights. The South African exclusionary rule was designed to strike a 
balance between these countervailing societal interests.  
 
In terms of South African common law courts were, after Ex Parte Minister of Justice 
in re R v Matemba,1 except for admissions,2 confessions,3 and pointings-out,4 not 
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1  Ex Parte Minister of Justice in re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75. In this case the admissibility of a 
palm print, taken against the will of the accused, was at issue. The Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court held the evidence to be admissible, as the police conduct did not result in 
testimonial compulsion. 
2  See s 219A Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (as amended) (hereafter the CPA). 
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especially concerned with the manner in which evidence had been obtained.5 The 
rationale for the existence of the exceptions relevant to admissions, confessions and 
pointings-out is in the main a lack of voluntariness,6 as well as the reliability 
principle.7 The golden rule that applied was whether or not the evidence obtained 
was relevant to the issues and, if the answer was in the affirmative, such evidence 
would in general be admissible. The incorporation of section 35(5) into the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19968 significantly changed this 
position. This provision reads as follows: 
 
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right contained in the Bill of Rights 
must be excluded if the admission of such evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
 
This provision suggests that evidence may be excluded (despite its relevance to the 
issues) if it was obtained as a result of an infringement of a right guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights, and if its admission would cause either of the consequences that this 
provision seeks to prevent. Naudé9 is of the opinion that the courts of South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  The admissibility of confessions is governed by s 217 of the CPA.  
4  See for example S v Nzama 2009 2 SACR 326 (KZP), where the admissibility of a pointing-out 
was in contention recently. For a discussion of the concepts of admissions, confessions and 
pointings-out, see Schwikkard 1991 SACJ 326; Du Toit et al Commentary 24-66I, 24-66N to 24-
66Q; also Kruger and Kriegler Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 621-624.  
5  See S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 (SCA) para 27; also Zeffertt and Paizes Law of Evidence 630; 
De Villiers (ed) TRC Report 191 sets out police practice in obtaining admissions and confessions 
in South Africa during that period as follows: "Numerous applicants [police officers] admitted that 
psychological and physical coercion was routinely used in both legal detentions and unlawful 
custody"; and at 619 the report concludes as follows: "It is accepted now that detention without 
trial allowed for the abuse of those held in custody, that torture and maltreatment were 
widespread and that, whilst officials of the former state were aware of what was happening, they 
did nothing about it." See also De Vos 2011 TSAR 269. 
6  See S v Januarie 1991 2 SACR 682 (SE); S v Sheehama 1991 2 SACR 860 (A) and S v Agnew 
1996 2 SACR 535 (C) 538. The admissibility of admissions, confessions and pointings-out are 
subject to technical requirements developed by the courts in their interpretation of the relevant 
sections, with the aim of creating procedural safeguards for the protection of the accused. For a 
discussion of the requirements for the admissibility of admissions, confessions and pointings-out, 
see Du Toit et al Commentary 24-50J to 24-82; also Kruger and Kriegler Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses 541-568. For the legal position in England on this issue, see s 76(5) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1986, as well as the matter of Lam Chi-ming v R 1991 LRC (Crim) 
416 422. 
7  S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 para 27; also Schwikkard 1991 SACJ 321-323. 
8  Henceforth referred to as the Constitution. 
9  Naudé 2009 Obiter 627. The opinion has been expressed before that the Grant admissibility 
framework is in essence an assessment of the factors analysed during the era of R v Collins 
1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC), but in different contexts – see Ally 2010 SALJ 710. The following remark 
by Cromwell J, made on behalf of the majority opinion in R v Côte 2011 SCC 46 para 46, 
confirms the correctness of this point of view: "In setting out this new framework, this Court made 
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should follow the Canadian admissibility framework recently adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R v Grant10 to assess the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. By contrast, De Vos11 is of the view that such 
an approach is not aligned to the structure of section 35(5). The latter point of view is 
supported. It is submitted that the admissibility assessment should consist of two 
tests that must be clearly separated from each other for the reason that the 
assessment in each leg of the analysis serves to enhance different societal 
interests.12 The discussion in this contribution is accordingly based upon this two-
legged approach, as opposed to that followed in the current Canadian admissibility 
framework.13 It must, however, be emphasised that section 24(2) Canadian Charter 
jurisprudence remains a valuable source for the interpretation of section 35(5). 
 
Endorsing the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal 
decision of R v Collins,14 the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Pillay v S15 reasoned that three groups of factors must be considered in order to 
assess whether the disputed evidence should be either received or excluded.16 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
it clear that while these lines of inquiry did not precisely track the categories of considerations set 
out in earlier jurisprudence, they did capture the factors relevant to the s. 24(2) determination that 
had been set out in earlier cases. In Beaulieu, Charron J., writing for the Court, emphasized this 
point, and noted that Grant did not change the relevant factors in the s. 24(2) analysis". Compare 
the comment by the distinguished Canadian scholar, Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l L 313, where he 
expresses the following view: "Much of the voluminous jurisprudence on section 24(2) over the 
past 27 years will be of little significance". I do, however, support Stuart's view that immediately 
follows the quoted sentence: "The Court has arrived at a revised discretionary approach to 
section 24(2) free of rigid rules, instead placing special emphasis on the seriousness of the 
breach rather than the seriousness of the offence or the reliability of the evidence. In my view, 
the Court has adopted a more sensible, carefully balanced and distinctive approach to the 
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence ..." – see Ally 2010 SALJ 712. One of the major 
departures from the Collins era is the fact that the conscripted/non-conscripted distinction has 
been discarded. 
10  R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC). 
11  De Vos 2011 TSAR 268. 
12  This approach should arguably be followed because of the textual differences between s 24(2) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 (henceforth "the Canadian Charter" or "the 
Charter") and s 35(5). Unlike the Canadian provision, which clearly sets out one criterion for the 
admissibility assessment, s 35(5) directs that South Africa's courts should determine firstly if 
admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair; and secondly what effect the exclusion or 
admission of the evidence would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system. In other 
words, the courts must demonstrate what effect the admission of the evidence would have on the 
fairness of the trial, whereas the Canadian courts are not bound by such a directive. See in this 
regard the comparable point of view held by De Vos 2011 TSAR 274. 
13  See, in this regard, Ally 2010 SALJ 713. 
14  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
15  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
16  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) paras 87 and 93. 
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first group of factors (trial fairness) is considered during the first leg of the 
admissibility assessment.17 The first leg of the assessment relates to the phrase 
"[e]vidence … must be excluded if its admission would render the trial unfair". This 
assessment is concerned with the effect that admission of the disputed evidence 
would have on the fairness of the trial. During the first leg of the assessment the 
public interest in protecting the rights of the accused is the key concern.18 This leg of 
the admissibility assessment is not explored in this article.19 
 
The second leg of the admissibility analysis relates to the phrase "would be 
detrimental to the administration of justice".20 The second and third groups of factors 
are evaluated during this leg of the admissibility assessment.21 The second group of 
factors is concerned with the seriousness of the constitutional infringement,22 and the 
third group of factors deals with the effect that exclusion may have on the integrity of 
the administration of justice.23 In this contribution, I explore the third group of factors 
(also known as the "effect of exclusion on the integrity of the criminal justice system" 
or an assessment of the "costs of exclusion"). In doing so I wish to join a number of 
South African commentators who have already made meaningful contributions 
towards the interpretation of section 35(5) of the Constitution.24  
                                                          
17  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) paras 87-90.  
18  Ally 2010 SALJ 713. 
19  For a discussion of the first leg of the admissibility assessment, see Schmidt and Rademeyer 
Bewysreg 378; Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally obtained evidence" (2009) 224-248, and the 
unpublished doctoral thesis by Ally Constitutional Exclusion 210-358. 
20  See Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 248. 
21  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 91, where the majority opinion introduced this leg of the 
assessment as follows: "This brings us to the second leg of the enquiry ..." 
22  For a discussion of the second group of factors, see Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained 
Evidence" (2009) 248-259; Schmidt and Rademeyer Bewysreg 381-382. 
23  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97, where Mpati DP and Motata AJA wrote the majority 
opinion and held as follows: "Lamer J, in the Collins case (at 138), says the question under 
section 24(2) of the Charter is whether the system's repute will be better served by the admission 
or the exclusion of the evidence. Our view is that the same applies under section 35(5) of the 
Constitution". 
24  See for example the significant contribution made by Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence" (2009) 181-259, and his contribution in Du Toit et al Commentary 24-98H to 
24-9N-12. See also Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 33-40; Schwikkard "Evidence" 52-
57 to 52-64; Schwikkard "Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons" 737-797; Naudé 2009 
SAPR/PL 506; Naudé 2001 SACJ 38-58; Schwikkard 1997 SAJHR 446-457; Zeffertt and Paizes 
Law of Evidence 625-641; Schutte 2000 SACJ 318-57-68; Ally 2010 SACJ 22; Ally 2010 CILSA 
239; De Villiers 1997 TSAR 615; De Villiers 1998 TSAR 20. 
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As said before, based on R v Collins,25 the relevant factors considered under the 
third group of factors are the "seriousness of the charges faced by the accused" and 
the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". An important issue that 
arises when this group of factors is considered is if the reliability of the evidence 
(particularly real evidence) and its significance in proving factual guilt should play a 
prominent role in the assessment. Given that the third group of factors is concerned 
with the public interest in crime control, it has been suggested that public opinion 
should be a weighty factor when this group of factors is considered.26 It is against 
this background that this contribution poses the following three questions: firstly, if 
the "current mood" of society should be accorded much weight when this group of 
factors is weighed and balanced against the other relevant factors during the 
admissibility assessment; secondly, if a consideration of the "seriousness of the 
charge" and "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction" could possibly 
encroach upon the presumption of innocence;27 and, finally, if factual guilt should be 
allowed to tilt the scales in favour of the admission of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence if the evidence is essential for a conviction on a serious charge?  
 
It is important to note that an admissibility assessment under section 35(5) is 
considered during a trial-within-a-trial.28 Nevertheless, the practice has recently 
developed that an accused may challenge the admissibility of evidence by means of 
a pre-trial motion on the grounds that a warrant authorising the search and seizure of 
evidence be declared invalid29 or that a provision contained in an Act of Parliament, 
authorising the issue and execution of a search warrant be declared 
                                                          
25  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
26  Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 249. 
27  For a discussion of this issue in the Canadian context, see Ally 2010 SALJ 705-706. 
28  See S v August 2005 2 All SA 605 (NC); S v Motloutsi 1996 1 SACR 78 (C); S v Melani 1996 2 
BCLR 174 (EC); S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C); S v Van der Merwe 1997 19 BCLR (O); S 
v Mathebula 1997 1 BCLR 123 (W); S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E); S v Madiba 1998 1 BCLR 38 
(D); S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W); S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T); S v Gumede 1998 
5 BCLR 530 (D); S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D); S v Malefo 1998 1 SACR 127 (W); S v 
Ngcobo 1998 10 BCLR 1248 (N); S v Muravha 1998 JOL 3994 (V); S v Cloete 1999 2 SACR 137 
(C); S v Hoho 1999 2 SACR 159 (C); S v R 2000 1 SACR 33 (W); S v Ndlovu 2001 1 SACR 85 
(W); S v Mashumpa 2008 1 SACR 128 (E); S v Nell 2009 2 SACR 37 (C); S v Matlou 2010 2 
SACR 342 (SCA); S v Dos Santos 2010 2 SACR 382 (SCA); S v Lachman 2010 2 SACR 52 
(SCA); S v Mkhize 2011 1 SACR 554 (KZD). See also Schmidt and Rademeyer Bewysreg 382; 
Du Toit et al Commentary 24-66D to 24-66J. 
29  See Bennett v Minster of Safety and Security 2006 1 SACR 523 (T); Mahomed v National 
Director of Safety and Security 2006 1 SACR 495 (W); Zuma v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2006 1 SACR 468 (D). 
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unconstitutional.30 However, in the decision of Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions,31 the 
Constitutional Court discouraged the application of this pre-trial remedy when it is 
aimed exclusively at circumventing the application of section 35(5) or at delaying the 
finalisation of criminal proceedings. 
 
It must be emphasised that although the focus in this contribution is centred on the 
third group of factors, it must be borne in mind that the section 35(5) assessment 
consists of a balancing exercise, where this group of factors should be weighed and 
balanced against other relevant factors before a court may decide whether either to 
admit or to exclude the disputed evidence.32 
 
This article is presented in three parts. The introduction (part 1) is followed by a 
discussion of the effect of exclusion on the integrity of criminal justice (also known as 
the third group of Collins factors) in part two. The discussion in part two is sub-
divided into three parts. It starts off by asking if the "current mood" of society should 
play a role in the admissibility assessment and, if so, should considerable weight be 
attached to it? Secondly, the "seriousness of the charge faced by the accused" is 
discussed, and thirdly, the "importance of the evidence in order to secure a 
conviction" is explored. This is followed by a short conclusion in part three, where a 
recommendation is made in regard to the assessment of the third group of factors. 
2 The effect of exclusion on the integrity of the criminal justice system 
(the social costs of exclusion) 
 
                                                          
30  Maghjane v Chairperson, North-West Gambling Board 2006 2 SACR 447 (CC). 
31  Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2008 ZACC 13 par 65; compare S v Basson 2007 1 SACR 566 (CC) para 262, 
where the Constitutional Court dismissed (in a different context) an application based on the 
contention that the issue of the admissibility of bail proceedings should not have been heard 
before the accused had been called upon to plead. 
32  For a discussion of this balancing exercise, see Ally 2010 SALJ 712-723. However, compare the 
approach followed in S v Mkhize 2011 1 SACR 554 (KZD) para 51, where Govindasamy AJ 
applied an approach based on the "automatic" exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
when he reasoned as follows: "I am in agreement with the learned Patel J in Viljoen's case: there 
is no discretion afforded to a judicial officer when he/she is confronted with a situation where 
evidence is obtained unconstitutionally. To admit such evidence, contaminated as it is, will be a 
violation of the accused's rights, and, above all, will be prejudicial to the administration of justice." 
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Should public opinion play a role in determining whether the exclusion or the 
admission of the disputed evidence could result in "detriment" to the administration 
of justice? If so, what weight should be attached to it? These issues are addressed 
below. 
 
2.1 The "current public mood" of society or public opinion33 
 
The Constitutional Court was called upon in S v Makwanyane34 to determine the 
relevance and weight to be attached to public opinion when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. Chaskalson P held that public opinion does play a role when interpreting the 
Constitution, but courts should not be slaves to it.35 In his often-quoted statement on 
this issue, Chaskalson P was prepared to assume that the majority of South Africans 
are in favour of the retention of the death penalty, and continued by demarcating the 
impact of public opinion when interpreting a constitutional provision as follows:36 
 
Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but in itself, it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive 
there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could 
then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable 
to the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to 
parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established by the 
1993 Constitution. 
 
It should be emphasised that Chaskalson P discussed the task of public opinion not 
only in relation to the constitutionality of the death penalty, but also with the intention 
of providing guidance with regard to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. To state the obvious, section 35(5) forms an integral part of the Bill of Rights. 
It follows that this pronouncement by Chaskalson P should apply with equal force to 
the interpretation of section 35(5). Differently put, section 35(5) should be regarded 
not only as a constitutional remedy, but it should also be considered as a 
fundamental right and should be interpreted accordingly. 
                                                          
33  For a discussion of the Canadian position see Ally 2010 SALJ 699-670, where the relevance of 
the Canadian approach to the interpretation of s 35(5) in general, and the significance of the 
Canadian approach to this aspect of our exclusionary rule in particular are explored. 
34  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). 
35  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
36  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
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In striking contrast to the approach adopted by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane,37 
Scott JA, writing a dissenting minority opinion in Pillay v S,38 referred to the caveat 
issued by Chaskalson P in the former decision, but distinguished the approach 
followed by Chaskalson P from the interpretation of section 35(5), and reasoned as 
follows:39 
 
It seems to me, however, that the very nature of the second leg of the inquiry 
postulated in section 35(5) of the Constitution contemplates a reference to public 
opinion. It must, at least, therefore constitute an important element of the inquiry.  
 
Scott JA reasoned that public opinion is a relevant factor in the admissibility 
assessment and that it should be accorded significant weight when the courts have 
to consider whether the admission or exclusion of the disputed evidence would be 
"detrimental to the administration of justice". Van der Merwe echoes this point of 
view when he argues that the phrase "would be detrimental to the administration of 
justice" is indicative of the fact that public opinion should be a prominent 
consideration when the third group of factors is assessed.40 This argument is 
vulnerable to criticism. Even though the concept of "detriment" involves the making 
of a value judgment determined by a presiding officer while taking into account the 
contemporary views of the public at large, this assessment should not be equated 
with a consideration of public opinion. Langa DP in S v Williams41 emphasised the 
importance of this distinction when he indicated that the South African Constitution is 
different from that of the United States. The President of the Constitutional Court 
held that South African courts should interpret the Constitution in accordance with 
the "values that underlie an open and democratic society based on [human dignity], 
                                                          
37  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
38  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
39  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 126.  Emphasis added. 
40  Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2002) 234. He contends the following: "It 
is submitted that the courts are … fully entitled to lean in favour of crime control. … [I]t is 
probably true that public opinion – including public acceptance of a verdict and support for the 
system – must go into the scale as a weighty factor". (Emphasis added). See also De Vos 2011 
TSAR 278. 
41  S v Williams 1995 7 BCLR 861 (CC). Langa DP was the Deputy President of the Constitutional 
Court when this judgment was delivered. 
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freedom and equality", instead of "contemporary standards of decency".42 In the light 
hereof, it is noteworthy that Langa DP intended to impress on South African courts 
that the prevailing public mood should occupy a subsidiary role in relation to the 
long-term values sought to be achieved by the Constitution.43 
 
It is suggested that the approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights (chapter 2 of the Constitution) should – depending on the rationale and the 
text of its constituent provisions – as far as possible be in accordance with its 
broader purposes.44 Put in another way, for the benefit of coherence and legal 
certainty there should sensibly be a consistent approach to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Within this context, South African courts should, when 
determining whether to exclude or admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence under 
section 35(5), take note of the reminder provided by Chaskalson P in S v 
Makwanyane.45 This is especially important when one takes into account that the 
Makwanyane court was called upon to provide a remedy for the vindication of 
constitutional guarantees – section 35(5) serves the equivalent purpose. It is 
accordingly submitted that South African courts should take note of public opinion 
when applying section 35(5), without seeking public popularity. Erasmus J is in 
favour of such an approach, as expounded by him in the decisions of S v 
                                                          
42  S v Williams 1995 7 BCLR 861 (CC) para 36-37. The judge intimated that the relationship 
between "contemporary standards of decency" and public opinion is uncertain, but added that he 
is unconvinced that they are synonymous. It should be stated that the concept of "human dignity" 
was not included as a constitutional value in the Interim Constitution. This constitutional value is 
included in the 1996 Constitution.  
43  Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 250, is of the view that the over-
emphasis on the "longer term constitutional values may result in a fairly rigid exclusionary rule – 
a result that the drafters of s 35(5) clearly wished to avoid". However, he correctly explains the 
predicament the courts would be faced with if public opinion were to be over-emphasised, in the 
following terms: "… over-emphasis of public opinion would result in a wide inclusionary approach 
– an approach which is … incompatible with a constitutional due process system". 
44  See the approach followed by the European Court of Human Rights in Klass v Germany 1961, 
Series A No 28 para 68, where it was held that the interpretation of a provision of the European 
Convention must be "in harmony with the logic of the Convention"; see further the Canadian 
approach in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 50 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC) which was followed by 
Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
45  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). Currie and De Waal (eds) Bill of Rights Handbook 10 
describe this attribute of the Constitution in the following terms: "The new Constitution is a 
democratic pre-commitment to a government that is constrained by certain rules, including the 
rule that a decision of the majority may not violate the fundamental rights of an individual". See 
also Moseneke 2012 SALJ 17, where he reasons that a "tension clearly exists between 
democratic theory and constitutional supremacy. This is not a dilemma peculiar to our shores. It 
is perhaps endemic to all constitutional democracies". 
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Nomwebu46 and S v Soci.47 He notes that public opinion is influenced by the 
seriousness of the violation48 and the seriousness of the charges,49 especially when 
one has regard to the state of "lawlessness" prevailing in South Africa.50 He also 
refers to the comments by Van der Merwe, where the latter correctly argues that the 
public might have a negative perception of the criminal justice system in the event 
that it is perceived as acquitting a dangerous criminal because of an infringement 
that could be classified as an insignificant technicality.51 Erasmus J further cautions 
that it is dangerous to ignore such public perceptions. Moreover, the judge reasoned, 
a consideration of the "prevailing public mood"52 provides a measure of flexibility to 
the application of the Bill of Rights and public acceptability of the values enshrined in 
the Constitution. Even so, the judge positioned the relevance of public opinion within 
its proper scope in section 35(5) challenges: 53 
 
Not that a court will allow public opinion to dictate its decision (S v Makwanyane 
and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 431C-F). The court should in fact endeavour 
to educate the public to accept that a fair trial means a constitutional trial, and vice 
versa. … It is therefore the duty of the courts in their everyday activity to carry the 
message to the public that the Constitution is not a set of high-minded values 
designed to protect criminals from their just deserts; but is in fact a shield which 
protects all citizens from official abuse. They must understand that for the courts to 
tolerate invasion of the rights of even the most heinous criminal would diminish their 
constitutional rights. In other words, the courts should not merely have regard to 
public opinion, but should mould people's thinking to accept constitutional norms 
using plain language understandable to the common man. 
 
The approach of Erasmus J complements the dictum of Chaskalson P in S v 
Makwanyane,54 while at the same time it is harmonious with the approach of 
Canadian counterparts as reflected in the decisions of R v Collins,55 R v Jacoy56 and 
                                                          
46  S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E). 
47  S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E). 
48  The second group of factors. 
49  The third group of factors. 
50  S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648a-c; S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 295. 
51  S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648a-c. This was also of concern to the full bench in S v 
Desai 1997 1 All SA 298 (W) 42b-f. See also Meintjies-Van der Walt 1996 SACJ 89. 
52  S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648. Compare the Canadian approach followed in R v 
Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) to the effect that the current mood of the public should be 
considered, only if it is reasonable. 
53  S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648d-f and S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 295-296 
(Emphasis in original). 
54  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
55  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
56  R v Jacoy 1998 38 CRR  290 (SCC). 
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R v Feeney.57 Moreover, the South African courts and commentators have 
expressed the view that the provisions contained in section 35(5) and section 24(2) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are remarkably similar.58 For these 
reasons, it is suggested that the dictum of Erasmus J accurately sets out the scope 
and function of public opinion in section 35(5) challenges. Of great value for South 
African section 35(5) jurisprudence is the remark by Erasmus J that admissibility 
rulings should not be premised on public opinion.  
 
Furthermore, there appears to be no convincing reason why the prudent approach 
adopted by Lamer J, in R v Collins,59 to the effect that the courts are customarily the 
only "effective shelter for individuals and unpopular minorities",60 should not be 
applicable to South African courts61 when "detriment to the administration of justice" 
has to be determined under section 35(5). The provisions of section 35(5) were 
introduced into the Bill of Rights in order to protect persons accused of having 
allegedly committed a crime from the power of the majority. In the light hereof, the 
protection granted by section 35(5) should not be left to the majority, from which the 
accused needs protection.62 No doubt the accused, when faced with the might of the 
prosecuting authority – with all its expertise and resources, representing the people 
of South Africa – represents a vulnerable minority. By showing a preparedness to 
protect the constitutional rights of the accused South African courts will instil public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Unwillingness to do so may produce the 
                                                          
57  R v Feeney 1997 115 CCC (3d) 129 (SCC). 
58  See for example Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 91 and S v Tandwa 2008 1 SACR para 
122; also Ally 2010 SALJ 695 where reference is made inter alia to Van der Merwe 
"Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 214 and Viljoen "Law of Criminal Procedure and 
the Bill of Rights" 5B-50. See further De Vos 2011 TSAR 271. 
59  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
60  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) para 34. 
61  In this regard, see the approach followed by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 
(CC) dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty. See also S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 
174 (EC) 352, where Froneman J concluded that: "It is true that courts should hold themselves 
accountable to the public, but that does not mean that they should seek public popularity"; also 
Moseneke 2012 SALJ 18; compare Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" 
(2002) 324. 
62  See in this regard the comments by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) 
para 88, where he reasoned that: "The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for 
vesting the power of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of 
minorities and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process. 
Those entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people of our 
society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest amongst us, that all 
of us can be secure that our own rights will be protected".  
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opposite result, which would be detrimental to the administration of justice. This 
argument is further fortified by the supremacy clause,63 which dictates that the 
Constitution shall be the supreme law in South Africa. Consequently, in the event 
that public opinion is in conflict with the provisions and objectives sought to be 
advanced by the Constitution, the latter must surely prevail.64  
 
Additionally, the undue emphasis on public opinion during the assessment of the 
third group of factors may disturb the very nature of the section 35(5) discretion. It 
could provide judges with the latitude to determine the admissibility issue based on 
their subjective views of the "current mood" of society. In such circumstances the 
possibility remains that the purposes sought to be achieved by section 35(5) might 
be hindered.65 Ostensibly with the aim of preventing the personal perspectives of 
judges from interfering with their section 35(5) assessments, the decision in R v 
Collins66 informs that judicial officers should refer to what they conceive to be the 
views of society at large, bearing in mind that they do not have an unfettered 
discretion: A presiding officer should constantly remind herself or himself that67 
 
… his [or her] discretion is grounded in community values. He [or she] should not 
render a decision that would be unacceptable to the community when the 
community is not being wrought in passion or otherwise under passing stress due to 
current events. 
 
This dictum of Lamer J in R v Collins68 clearly indicates that public attitudes towards 
exclusion or admission do matter69 when a court determines the second leg of the 
                                                          
63  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
64  Kentridge and Spitz "Interpretation" 11-16A, where they argue that: "The effect of the supremacy 
clause is to assign to the courts a role which extends beyond interpreting and enforcing the 
majority will, to the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals and minorities". 
65  See for example the approach in S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T). 
66  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
67  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) para 34. See also S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 352, 
where this dictum was quoted with approval. 
68  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) para 34. 
69  The South African High Court adopted this approach. See, for example, S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 
174 (EC) 297, where the court dealt with the function of public opinion and its role in the 
admissibility assessment when the charges are of a serious nature, as follows: "At the time of 
delivery of this judgment it is, I think, fair to say that there is a widespread public perception that 
crime is on the increase … I venture to suggest that a public opinion poll would probably show 
that a majority of our population would at this stage of the history of our country be quite content 
if the courts allow evidence at a criminal trial, even if it was unconstitutionally obtained". 
Furthermore, Froneman J, in S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 352, was mindful of the fact that 
the "current public mood" of the public towards unconstitutionally obtained evidence favoured the 
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admissibility inquiry, provided that the "current mood" of society could not be 
characterised as unreasonable.70 What could be categorised as unreasonable 
should not be left to the all-encompassing discretion of the presiding officer.71 A 
presiding officer should always be mindful of the fact that he or she is interpreting a 
constitutional provision and his or her decision should therefore demonstrate that 
due regard has been given to the values that underpin the Constitution.72  
 
More importantly, an over-emphasis on public opinion would necessarily imply that a 
consideration of the long-term effect that the regular admission of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence would have on the integrity of the justice system would be 
relegated to an insignificant concern, especially when the evidence was important for 
a conviction on a serious charge.  
 
In what follows, attention is paid to two factors which comprise the third group of 
factors. As stated before, these factors are the "seriousness of the charge" and the 
"importance of the evidence to secure a conviction".73  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inclusion of evidence, but declined to be bound by such public attitudes, and observed as 
follows: "It is true that courts should hold themselves accountable to the public, but that does not 
mean that they should seek public popularity". 
70  See R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) paras 33-34.  
71  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) paras 33-34. 
72  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 297 and S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648d-f. 
73  In this regard the view of Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l L 326 is of great importance: "... while reliability of 
evidence and whether the evidence is essential to the Crown's case are relevant considerations, 
they do not trump" during the balancing exercise that must be performed when our courts 
determine whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence should either be admitted or excluded. 
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2.2 The seriousness of the charge74 
All open and democratic societies have, over the years, adopted norms that serve 
the purpose of categorising crimes according to the severity of their impact on 
society.75 The seriousness of the charge is primarily determined by the punishment a 
court may impose.76 Mahoney77 suggests that the seriousness of the charge should 
not only be considered based on objective norms, but that any aggravating 
circumstances of a particular case, regardless of the offence charged, should be 
taken into account. A court may furthermore determine the seriousness of the charge 
faced by the accused by considering facts that are not in dispute in the main trial,78 
facts in the trial-within-trial,79 and the allegations contained in the charge sheet.80  
 
It should be emphasised that due regard should be had, when considering this 
factor, to the presumption of innocence and the values sought to be protected by this 
constitutionally entrenched right. The Constitutional Court has typified the 
presumption of innocence as "fundamental to our concepts of justice and forensic 
fairness".81 What should therefore be assessed under this group of factors should be 
the seriousness of the offence charged and not the seriousness of the crime 
committed.82  
 
                                                          
74  Ally 2010 SALJ 704-705 discusses the Canadian approach to this group of factors.  The courts of 
Canada have been reluctant to apply this group of factors (the "seriousness of the charge" and 
"the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction") prior to the decision in R v Grant 2009 
66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC). In the Grant decision paras 79-84, the Supreme Court of Canada preferred 
to discuss the third group of factors under the heading "Society's interest in an adjudication on 
the merits". Three factors are considered under this line of inquiry: firstly, the reliability of the 
evidence; secondly, the importance of the evidence for the prosecution's case. However, this 
factor is relevant in a very limited sense – the exclusion of relevant, reliable evidence would have 
a more negative impact on the justice system where the exclusion in effect destroys the 
prosecution's case. A third factor is the seriousness of the offence. This factor is neutral: the 
failure to prosecute a serious charge may have an immediate negative effect on how society 
views the criminal justice system. However, the public must rest assured that, despite the 
seriousness of the charge, the courts do take rights-protection seriously. In other words, the 
short-term public outrage at the lack of a conviction does not mean that the judge must ignore 
the long-term integrity of the justice system. 
75  Morissette 1984 McGill LJ 528. 
76  Morissette 1984 McGill LJ 529. 
77  Mahoney 1999 CLQ 461, next to fn 41 of his contribution. 
78  See S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D) 507-522. 
79  See S v Malefo 1998 1 SACR 127 (W) 133 and 138. 
80  S v Malefo 1998 1 SACR 127 (W) 133 and 138. 
81  S v Zuma 1995 4 BCLR 401(CC) para 36. 
82  See S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 297, where the importance of the presumption of innocence 
was highlighted, thus emphasising this distinction. 
D ALLY                                                                                          PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
491 / 638 
 
South African courts appear to acknowledge the presumption of innocence when 
they consider this factor.83 In S v Melani84 the charges against the accused were 
murder, robbery, and the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition.85 These 
are indisputably serious charges. The three accused were conscripted against 
themselves.86 Froneman J observed that a public opinion poll would have suggested 
that the evidence should nevertheless be admitted, despite the seriousness of the 
constitutional violations. However, after the judge gave due consideration to the 
presumption of innocence, the evidence was excluded.87 Froneman J based his 
decision on "the longer term purpose of the Constitution, to establish a democratic 
order based on, amongst others, the recognition of basic human rights".88 The court 
made its admissibility ruling while emphasising that it was not bound by the "current 
mood" of society. In terms of this point of view, admission or exclusion hinges on a 
balance between the truth-seeking function of the courts and the preservation of the 
constitutional directive contained in section 35(5), that courts have a duty to 
safeguard the integrity of the justice system.  
 
However, the perception should not be created that the more serious the charges, 
the lesser the protection accorded to an accused should be. Correspondingly, the 
courts should not be more amenable to exclude evidence when the charges are 
regarded as less serious.89 The potential harmful effect of such an approach on the 
integrity of the criminal justice system is instantly recognisable. It is agreed with 
Stuart who argues that the Ontario Court of Appeal erred in R v Grant90 by adopting 
the philosophy that the more serious the offence charged, the greater the probability 
that the administration of justice will be brought into disrepute by the exclusion of 
evidence which is important to secure a conviction, because this approach implies 
                                                          
83  See S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC). 
84  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC). 
85  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) was decided in terms of the Interim Constitution. It is 
nonetheless submitted that the Melani court applied the rationale of s 35(5) when the 
admissibility challenge was considered. This explains the relevance of this decision, despite the 
fact that judgment was delivered in terms of the Interim Constitution. 
86  Based on Canadian precedent, this means that the evidence has been obtained without 
constitutional compliance, or statutory authority, or the informed consent of the accused.  See 
Ally 2010 SALJ 697. 
87  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353. 
88  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353. 
89  This is one of the concerns raised by Canadian scholars. See Ally 2010 SALJ 705. 
90  R v Grant 2006 38 CR (6th) 58. 
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that there should be "a de facto two-tier system where one zone is Charter-free and 
the police ends always justify the means".91 An analogous line of reasoning was 
applied in the Australian case of R v Dalley,92 where Spigelman CJ expressed the 
opinion of the court as follows: 
 
… the public interest in admitting evidence varies directly with the gravity of the 
offence. The more serious the offence, the more likely it is that the public interest 
requires the admission of the evidence. 
 
These rigid approaches suggest that the seriousness of the charges should be an 
influential factor in the admissibility assessment. In my view, this approach implies 
that the less serious the charge faced by the accused, the greater constitutional 
protection should be accorded to him or her. Equally, the more serious the charge, 
the less likely it is that the evidence would be excluded.93 This inflexible line of 
reasoning should not be determinative of the admissibility assessment. Such an 
approach implies that an accused may not rely on the presumption of innocence 
merely because the prosecution alleges that he or she has committed a serious 
offence. Differently put, the remedy contained in section 35(5) would be rendered 
superfluous if the accused faces a serious charge.94 Stuart95 highlighted the danger 
of this approach in heads of argument filed in the appeal of R v Grant.96 In addition, 
such an approach flies in the face of the constitutional value of equal protection 
before the law and equal benefit of the law.97 More to the point, it would offend the 
integrity of the justice system, and should primarily for this reason not be followed by 
the South African courts when this group of factors is considered.  
 
                                                          
91  Stuart Heads of Argument para 15, filed off record in the appeal of R v Grant, at the time of 
publication reported as 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 SCC. 
92  R v Dalley 2002 NSWCCA 284 para 3. 
93  See Davies 2002 CLQ 27, where he remarks that a proportionality test applied in this manner 
creates a "rights paradise" for those charged with trivial offences, but alleged rapists and 
murderers will find themselves in "a due process desert". He highlights at 29 the fact that a 
proportionality test runs counter to the presumption of innocence. 
94  Davies 2002 CLQ 29 highlights the fact that a proportionality test, applied in this manner, runs 
counter to the presumption of innocence. 
95  Stuart Heads of Argument. In para 15 he argues: "Without the remedy of exclusion in cases 
where the court considers the crime serious there will be a large number of criminal trials where 
the Charter will cease to provide protection". 
96  R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 SCC. 
97  See s 9 of the Constitution. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada recently had the opportunity to deal with this issue in 
R v Côté,98 which arguably gives effect to the goals sought to be achieved by both 
section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter and section 35(5) of the Constitution. The 
court accepted that, in general, "the more serious the offence, the greater the 
likelihood that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by its 
exclusion".99 However, the court qualified this observation by adding that this factor 
has the "potential to 'cut both ways' and will not always weigh in favour of 
admission".100 Cromwell J,101 reasoned as follows:102 
 
While society has a greater interest in seeing a serious offence prosecuted, it has 
an equivalent interest in ensuring that the judicial system is above reproach, 
particularly when the stakes are high. 
 
This dictum conveys the clear message that the purpose sought to be advanced by 
the exclusionary rule is ultimately a significant factor in the admissibility assessment. 
Put in another way, it would – depending on the circumstances of each case – be 
appropriate to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence which links the accused 
to serious charges if the admission of such evidence would be harmful to the 
integrity of the administration of justice. Against this background, the approach 
followed in S v Melani103 seems to be correct: even if the public has a crucial interest 
in a successful prosecution when the accused faces a serious charge, our courts 
should be mindful of the fact that they have been entrusted with the responsibility of 
upholding the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. In my view, the Bill of Rights 
has been designed to protect the "worst and the weakest amongst us" from the 
heightened public interest in securing a conviction when an accused faces a serious 
charge.104 Differently put, the short-term public outcry when an accused facing a 
serious charge is acquitted because unconstitutionally obtained evidence that is 
                                                          
98  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46. 
99  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 54. 
100  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 54. 
101  McLachlin CJ, Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein JJ concurring. Deschamps J 
dissenting. 
102  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 54. 
103  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC). 
104  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
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essential to a conviction was excluded should not be allowed to disturb the long-term 
constitutional goal of enhancing the integrity of the criminal justice system.105  
 
2.3 The importance of the evidence for a conviction 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated in R v Collins106 that the "importance of the 
evidence to secure a conviction" should be considered under this group of factors in 
order to determine what effect the exclusion or admission of the disputed evidence 
would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system. This approach was 
endorsed by the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay v S,107 
and recently applied by the same court in S v Matlou.108 An important issue 
considered here is: should the Canadian precedent established in R v Collins109 
relating to this factor be applied by the courts of South Africa? Furthermore, is it 
possible to determine how important the evidence is for a successful prosecution 
without encroaching upon the presumption of innocence?  
 
It is in the interests of the prosecution to demonstrate that the disputed evidence is 
essential for a conviction and that it should for that reason be received by the court. 
In other words, the prosecution must present evidence that suggests that the costs 
of exclusion would be high. Since the costs of exclusion would be high the 
prosecution would be entitled to argue that such evidence should be received rather 
than excluded because exclusion would, under the circumstances, be "detrimental" 
to the administration of justice. However, the importance of an impugned confession, 
                                                          
105  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353; R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC) para 84; R v Côté 
2011 SCC 46 para 48, where this contention was raised in the following terms by the majority 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, citing R v Harrison 2009 SCC 34 para 40: "… the 
seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence should not be permitted to 
'overwhelm' the s. 24(2) analysis because this 'would deprive those charged with serious crimes 
of the protection of the individual freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in 
effect declare that in the administration of criminal law 'the ends justify the means' ". The Court 
continued and underlined that: "In all cases, courts must assess the long-term repute of the 
administration of justice". This dictum was delivered in response to the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, where the latter court emphasised the seriousness of the offence and held that the 
evidence must inter alia for this reason be admitted. 
106  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) paras 36-39. 
107  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
108  S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 (SCA) para 32, where Bosielo JA reasoned (Leach and Cloete JJA 
concurring) that "it is clear from the proven evidence that the evidence of the pointings out by the 
first appellant and the concomitant utterances made by him were crucial to the State's case". 
109  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
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admission or pointing-out may more often than not be demonstrated solely by means 
of the contents of the disputed testimonial evidence or the disputed incriminating 
conduct and the accompanying statement. It was held in the case of S v January: 
Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo,110 that the disputed evidence (the contents of 
the testimonial evidence) may not be admitted until the court has made a ruling on its 
admissibility after a trial-within-a-trial. Furthermore, the case of S v Lebone111 
effectively insulates the presumption of innocence from encroachment when the 
admissibility of testimonial evidence is the subject of the admissibility dispute.  
 
The Lebone decision confirms the position in South African law that the prosecution 
may not lead evidence that discloses the contents of the disputed incriminating 
testimonial evidence unless the accused challenges its admissibility on the basis that 
the information therein contained is fabricated or that it originates from another 
source.112 The prosecution may therefore not introduce evidence relating to the 
contents of the testimonial evidence obtained after a constitutional infringement, 
even in section 35(5) challenges, for the same reason that evidence of this nature 
was not allowed before the enactment of section 35(5).113 As a consequence, when 
the prosecution is called upon to demonstrate the "importance of the disputed 
evidence to secure a conviction" – while the content of the disputed testimonial 
evidence is the only source – the prosecution would be faced with the dilemma 
presented by the Lebone and January decisions.  
 
Nevertheless, a court should, when making the section 35(5) determination - based 
on the current admissibility framework114 - include this factor (the importance of the 
evidence for a conviction) in its assessment when it makes a value judgment115 as to 
whether the admission or exclusion of the impugned evidence would be detrimental 
                                                          
110  S v January: Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 2 SACR 801 (A). 
111  S v Lebone 1965 2 SA 837 (A); see also S v Khuzwayo 1990 1 SACR 365 (SCA); S v Tsotsetsi 1 
2003 2 SACR 623 (W). 
112  S v Lebone 1965 2 SA 837 (A) 841-842; S v Tsotsetsi 1 2003 2 SACR 623 (W) 627-628; see 
also Du Toit et al Commentary 24-66G and Zeffertt and Paizes Law of Evidence 566. 
113  See S v Tsotsetsi 1 2003 2 SACR 623 (W) 628. 
114  See for example the minority judgment in Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 132; S v 
Shongwe 1998 2 SACR 321 (T) 344-345. 
115  S v Lottering 1999 12 BCLR 1478 (N) 1483; Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) paras 92 and 97. 
See also Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 36; Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence" (2002) 201. 
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to the administration of justice. The difficulty in making such an assessment while 
having due regard to the presumption of innocence was pointed out by McCall J in S 
v Naidoo,116 when the judge observed that it "was by no means apparent at this 
stage of the trial quite how material the evidence is", but he nevertheless assumed 
its importance in view of the vigour with which the prosecution attempted to have it 
admitted and the defence sought to have it excluded.117 Moreover, the Januarie and 
Lebone decisions clearly dictate that a consideration of factual guilt cannot be added 
to the admissibility assessment when the prosecution relies on testimonial evidence. 
The fact that an onus should not be applied to determine whether admission or 
exclusion would render the trial unfair or otherwise be "detrimental" to the 
administration of justice118 may not assist the prosecution if the disputed evidence is 
not sufficiently linked to the charges.119 This problem is highlighted by the decision 
by Van Reenen J in S v Mayekiso,120 when the judge excluded the disputed real 
evidence, relying on the following reason: 121 
 
Die Handves van Menseregte in Hoofstuk 3 van die Grondwet beliggaam, is juis, 
onder andere, daarop gerig om die individu teen magsmisbruik deur 
owerheidsorgane te beskerm en 'n erodering daarvan behoort, myns insiens, 
gedoog te word slegs waar die belangrikheid van die teenbelang wat deur die 
miskenning bevorder kan word vir dwingende redes so 'n afwyking regverdig. Die 
onderhawige is, myns insiens, nie so 'n geval nie, omdat dit nie moontlik is om 
vanuit die getuienis wat in die binneverhoor aangebied is die wesenlikheid van die 
items waarop beslag gelê is, in die vervolging van die beskuldigdes te bepaal nie. 
 
Although this decision was delivered prior to the enactment of section 35(5), and 
despite the fact that the evidence in dispute was real evidence, its relevance is clear: 
the court considered "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". It also 
confirms the difficulty faced by the prosecution in presenting evidence, during a trial-
                                                          
116  S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D). See also S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W) 400. 
117  S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D) 530. 
118  See Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2002) 201; Steytler Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure 36. 
119  S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C) 306. 
120  S v Mayekiso 1996  2 SACR 298 (C). 
121 S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C) 307. Loosely translated, this passage has the following 
meaning: The Bill of Rights, contained in chapter 3 of the Constitution has been designed inter 
alia to protect the individual against the abuse of power by government institutions. The erosion 
of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights ought, in my view, be permitted only when the 
limitation of those rights is justified by countervailing and pressing societal needs. The present 
case is not such a case because, when the evidence tendered in the trial-within-a-trial is 
considered, it is not possible to assess the significance of the seized items in the successful 
prosecution of the accused. (Own translation). 
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within-a-trial, which may persuade a court that relevant evidence should be received 
in the face of a constitutional infringement, because it is important to secure a 
conviction of the accused.  
 
The difficulty in making an assessment of the "importance of the evidence to secure 
a conviction" became obvious in the decisions of S v Shongwe122 and the minority 
opinion in Pillay v S.123 The Shongwe decision is briefly explored first, followed by a 
short discussion of the minority decision in Pillay. The accused in the Shongwe case 
faced serious charges. The accused was not informed about the right to legal 
representation, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining 
silent before he made a pointing-out and confessed to committing the crime.124 While 
considering the admissibility of the disputed evidence, the court was of the opinion 
that "[a]s 'n skuldige persoon in hierdie omstandighede vry uitgaan, sal dit 
teenproduktief wees vir die bevordering van menseregte ...".125 This dictum might 
create the impression among reasonable, objective and informed persons that 
factual guilt informed or significantly influenced the outcome of the admissibility 
assessment. Such an approach would be vulnerable to the criticism that it could 
make inroads into the presumption of innocence.  
 
In similar vein Scott JA, writing a minority opinion in Pillay v S,126 made the following 
remark while assessing the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction":127 
 
                                                          
122 S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T). 
123 Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
124 S v Shongwe 1998 2 SACR 321 (T) 334. 
125 S v Shongwe 1998 2 SACR 321 (T) 345. Loosely translated, this means that "it would be counter-
productive for the advancement of a culture of human rights if a guilty person were to be 
acquitted in these circumstances ..." (Own translation). See also S v Muravha 1998 JOL 3994 (V) 
16, where Preller AJ reasoned that the failure by the presiding magistrate to inform an accused 
of his right to remain silent, when there was a causal link between his confessional statement 
and the magistrate's failure to inform the accused about his rights, constitutes a "breach of a less 
serious nature". The judge reasoned that such a breach does not justify "the acquittal of a person 
who, in a hypothetical case, is clearly guilty of a serious offence". Compare Stuart 2010 Sw L Int'l 
L 318, where he reasons that: "Ignorance of Charter standards must not be rewarded or 
encouraged and negligence and wilful [sic] blindness cannot be equated with good faith". In other 
words, the Muravha court over-emphasised the seriousness of the charge and the importance of 
the evidence, thus failing to attach sufficient importance to the seriousness of the infringement. 
126  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
127  Pillay v S 2004  2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 133. 
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Whether the admission of the evidence and the resultant conviction of accused 10 
would be detrimental to the administration of justice involves, I think, an inquiry 
whether an acquittal would be likely to bring about a loss of respect for the judicial 
process in the eyes of reasonable and dispassionate members of society and, 
conversely, whether a conviction would be likely to result in a loss of respect for the 
Bill of Rights (emphasis added). 
 
This factor has been construed to entail that our courts must consider what effect 
either the admission or exclusion of the disputed evidence would have on the 
integrity of the criminal justice system. The concern with such an analysis is that, in 
order to give effect to this inquiry, our courts must consider what impact their 
admissibility rulings (either admission or exclusion) would have on the outcomes (a 
conviction or an acquittal) in the cases before them. Such an assessment links 
admissibility to criminal culpability. Thus, if the issue of admissibility is closely tied to 
the criminal culpability of the accused, such an approach might be frowned upon by 
fundamental rights protagonists, since it implicitly promotes the erosion of the 
presumption of innocence.128 Such an approach implies that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence should be readily admitted in the event that the accused is 
adjudged to be factually guilty. Taken to its logical conclusion, evidence should 
regularly be excluded when the accused is likely to be acquitted.129 Surely, this could 
not have been the purpose sought to be advanced by section 35(5). If this were the 
case, the rationale for the existence of the constitutional provision would be 
defeated. 
 
It is not suggested that the blame for this approach lay at the doorstep of the judge in 
the Shongwe decision and that of the minority opinion in Pillay. On the contrary, I 
would offer the opinion that this difficulty is intrinsically linked to the nature of the 
inquiry, which prompted the relevant courts to consider what impact an acquittal 
would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system (when the accused is 
factually guilty). The nature of the inquiry called upon the Shongwe court and the 
minority decision in Pillay to link the admissibility assessment to criminal culpability 
and, in so doing, possibly encroached upon the presumption of innocence. In my 
                                                          
128  Compare the approach followed in S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353. See also Ntzweli v S 
2001 2 All SA 184 (C), where it was held that the "question of the factual guilt of the accused 
should not be considered in a trial-within-a-trial". 
129  Sopinka J adopted a similar approach in R v Grant 1994 84 CCC (3d) 173 203a-b. 
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view the nature of the inquiry inevitably leads to such a linkage,130 because an 
analysis taking into account "the importance of the evidence for a conviction" 
necessarily concerns itself with the outcome of the case, in the sense that the 
exclusion of the disputed evidence, crucial for a conviction on a serious charge, will 
more often than not have an adverse effect on the integrity of the criminal justice 
system if the accused is factually guilty.  
 
Conversely, the majority opinion (written by Mpati DP and Motata AJA) in Pillay v 
S,131 whilst acknowledging the concerns of Scott JA, placed great emphasis on the 
duty of the courts to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.132 On this 
basis the majority opinion concluded that the disputed evidence should be excluded 
so as to prevent judicial contamination.133 The majority judgment in Pillay v S134 
placed a high premium on their function as protectors of constitutional rights, even 
though the social costs of exclusion in this case were great.135 In my view society 
paid a significantly high premium in Pillay v S,136 given that the accused was 
factually guilty137 of a serious offence,138 and the evidence that could in all probability 
have secured a conviction139 was excluded.140 Heeding the rationale of section 
                                                          
130  This link is effectively avoided in Canadian admissibility assessments, because admissibility 
challenges are dealt with during pre-trial motions before criminal culpability is assessed. 
131  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
132  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
133  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97, where the judges reasoned as follows: "The police, 
in behaving as they did, ie charging accused 10 in spite of the undertaking, and the courts 
sanctioning such behaviour, the objective referred to will in future be well nigh impossible to 
achieve".  
134  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
135  See also the following decisions where the social costs were high. In S v Tandwa 2007 SCA 34 
(RSA); S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D); S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE); S v Motloutsi 1996 1 
SACR 78 (C) and S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W), the accused were factually guilty of serious 
offences. Even so, the respective courts held that the unconstitutionally obtained evidence that 
firmly linked the individual accused persons to the crimes should be excluded. However, in S v 
Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC), the accused was convicted regardless of the fact that the 
unconstitutionally obtained confession, obtained following a violation of the right to legal 
representation, had been excluded. The remainder of the admissible evidence persuaded the 
court of the criminal culpability of the accused. It can for this reason be argued that the social 
costs of exclusion were not high in the Melani decision, since the exclusion did not result in the 
acquittal of an accused who was factually guilty. 
136  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
137  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
138  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 71. 
139  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97.  
140  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 98. For an analogous approach by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, see S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 (SCA) para 31. The accused in Matlou was assaulted 
by the police with the aim of obtaining self-incriminating evidence against him. Additionally, his 
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35(5), the majority opinion asserted its dissociation with the unwarranted police 
conduct as the ground for excluding reliable real evidence essential to securing the 
conviction of the accused.141 The accused was consequently acquitted.142 This 
approach by the majority opinion is supported. 
 
The inherent weakness of an approach that adds factual guilt into the equation 
during the admissibility assessment is pertinently demonstrated by the comments 
made by the full bench in S v Mkhize,143 where Willis J wrote a unanimous judgment 
to the effect that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding the 
obtainment of search warrants are not intended for:144 
 
… the purpose of ensuring the fairness of a trial of an accused person but to protect 
the ordinary law-abiding citizens of our land from an abuse of the formidable powers 
which the police necessarily have.  
 
The court in S v Mkhize145 conveyed an inapt message to those accused of having 
allegedly committed criminal offences: that they may not rely on the presumption of 
innocence. It also sent an improper message to law enforcement agencies, to the 
effect that the goals of crime control justify unwarranted interference with 
constitutional rights, that the end justifies the means, a sentiment reminiscent of the 
rationale of the common law inclusionary rule. The Mkhize judgment further implies 
that when the unconstitutional police conduct leads to the discovery of real evidence 
that confirms the factual guilt of the accused, such evidence could be admitted, 
regardless of the manner in which it had been obtained. Some might understandably 
argue that the court practically vindicated the unconstitutional search after the fact. 
The danger inherent in such an approach is that it might create the perception that 
our courts do not have a high regard for the constitutional rights guaranteed in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
right to legal representation and his right to remain silent were infringed. After a discoverability 
analysis the court held that the admission of the disputed evidence would not only render his trial 
unfair, but its admission would also be detrimental to the administration of justice. As a result, 
real evidence, essential for convictions on serious charges (and which linked the accused to 
such charges) was excluded. Compare S v Lachman 2010 2 SACR 52 (SCA), where a 
discoverability analysis resulted in the admission of the disputed evidence. 
141  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
142  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 98. 
143  S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W); compare S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353, where the 
presumption of innocence was duly considered.  
144  S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W) 637. (Emphasis added). 
145  S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W) 637. 
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Bill of Rights. The Mkhize judgment seemingly failed to take into account that an 
admissibility ruling should be focussed not only on that particular case, but that 
courts should also consider what effect the regular admission of evidence obtained 
in such a manner would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system.146 
 
To summarise, the majority judgment in Pillay v S147 appropriately conveys the 
message that the costs of exclusion should not be determinative of the outcome of 
the admissibility assessment. The opposing approach implies that reliable real 
evidence essential for a conviction on serious charges would be more readily 
admitted. The admission of the disputed evidence under these circumstances would 
evidently find public support, especially when South Africans are enduring high 
levels of serious crime.148 Such an approach is also strongly associated with the 
common law inclusionary rule. It is submitted that section 35(5) implicitly overrules 
this common law practice.149 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
The high rate of serious crime in South Africa should not be considered as a factor 
that unduly tilts the scales in favour of the admission of the disputed evidence. South 
African courts should be wary not to convey the message to society that the ends of 
crime control justify the use of unconstitutional means. Such an approach would be 
tantamount to informing members of society at large that their rights guaranteed in 
the Bill of Rights are not of any value for the reason that the high rate of serious 
crime in South Africa does not show any signs of decline.150 This implies that South 
Africans should accept that what the Constitution guarantees should not be taken 
seriously.  
 
The "current mood" of society does matter in the section 35(5) assessment. This is 
common cause between both due process protagonists and those in favour of crime 
                                                          
146  R v Traverse 2003 Carswell Nfld 119 paras 34-36. 
147  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
148  See the reasoning of Scott JA in Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 133. 
149  Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l Law 318, citing R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC) para 84. 
150  See the approach of the minority opinion in Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97, and the 
reasoning in S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T).  
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control values. The differences emerge when one has to determine the weight that 
should be attached to the "current mood" of society.151 Those in favour of crime 
control would suggest that the "current mood" of society should feature prominently 
during the second phase of the admissibility inquiry. South African scholarly writers, 
like their Canadian counterparts,152 are divided on this issue.153 Likewise, South 
African decisions are incompatible with regard to the weight that should be attached 
to public opinion.154 The guidance of the Constitutional Court on this important issue 
is awaited.  
 
Section 35(5) enjoins South African courts not to be swayed by the pressures of 
public opinion but to assure all South Africans – regardless of the fact that they are 
accused of having committed the most heinous crimes and no matter if the likelihood 
is great that they actually committed such crimes – that the goals of crime control do 
not justify unconstitutional police conduct. Instead, the goal of preserving the integrity 
of the criminal justice system is of paramount importance in section 35(5) 
challenges.155 It is submitted that, while the "current public mood" of society may be 
a relevant consideration in the admissibility assessment, it should not replace the 
fundamental duty of South African courts to "uphold and protect the Constitution and 
the human rights entrenched in it", and to administer justice to "all persons alike 
without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law".156 
 
The presumption of innocence deserves particular protection in a constitutional 
democracy based on human dignity, freedom and equality, even when the evidence 
is essential to convict an accused facing serious charges. For this reason the 
admissibility inquiry must be isolated from the assessment of factual guilt. 
                                                          
151  De Villiers 1997 TSAR 622; Schutte 2000 SACJ 67. 
152  Paciocco 1989 CLQ 340-345 argues that the courts should seek public popularity. Compare 
Roach Remedies 10-83 to 10-84, who is opposed to this view. 
153  Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2002) 234; De Villiers 2008 TSAR 37; 
compare Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 40, who is of the opinion that the long-term 
values of the Constitution should be a dominant feature.  
154  See for example S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T); S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W); S v 
Ncgobo 1998 10 BCLR 1248 (W); compare S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC); S v Nomwebu 
1996 2 SACR 396 (E); S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E). 
155  S v Mthembu 2008 ZASCA 51 para 33, where Cachalia JA, writing for a unanimous Supreme 
Court of Appeal, confirmed this contention in the following terms: "… the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice". 
156  The oath taken by judges when they take office, contained in item 6 of Schedule 2 of the 
Constitution. 
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Furthermore, the fact that the accused is factually guilty should not be determinative 
of the admissibility assessment. Contrary to the approach followed by the minority 
opinion in Pillay v S,157 it is suggested that the admissibility issue should not, in order 
to protect the presumption of innocence, be closely linked to criminal culpability.158 In 
my view the nature of the assessment seems to be the reason why this approach 
was followed by the minority opinion in the Pillay decision.  
 
In the light hereof it is suggested that our courts should rather focus on the "reliability 
of the evidence" (or the nature of the evidence) and the seriousness of the charge 
faced by the accused when assessing the third group of factors. This does not mean 
that the factor of the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction" should be 
totally disregarded. The reliability of the evidence is a key factor when determining 
the importance of the evidence for a successful prosecution. Cromwell J explained 
why this is the case, in R v Côté, when he reasoned that when a conviction is based 
on unreliable evidence, the admission of such evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute; by contrast, the exclusion of reliable evidence 
may impact negatively on the truth-seeking role of the criminal justice system when 
such an exclusion destroys the prosecution's case.159 From this point of view, the 
assessment of the importance of the evidence for the prosecution hinges on the 
reliability of the evidence. 
 
It is further suggested that the reliability of the evidence should be a key 
consideration (among others) under the third group of factors for the following 
reasons.160 First, the assessment of the suggested factor will overcome the difficulty 
(as argued above) experienced by our courts when they assess the "importance of 
the evidence for a conviction". In other words, the implicit erosion of the presumption 
of innocence will be avoided. Secondly, the suggested refocusing on the reliability of 
the evidence is not at odds with an assessment of the public interest in crime control 
                                                          
157  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 133. 
158  See Ntzweli v S 2001 2 All SA 184 (C) 188. 
159  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 47. 
160  While bearing in mind the observation by Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l L 326, that, although the reliability 
of evidence and whether or not it is essential for a successful prosecution are relevant 
considerations, they should not inevitably prevail during the balancing exercise that must be 
performed during admissibility assessments under s 35(5). 
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and the integrity of the criminal justice system. In contrast, such interests are placed 
within their proper context when the reliability of the evidence is considered a key 
factor. Thirdly, the suggested focus on the reliability of the evidence will, from a 
purely pragmatic point of view, markedly decrease the difficulty experienced by the 
prosecution when presenting evidence about the costs of exclusion. Finally, an 
assessment of the reliability of the evidence is strongly aligned to the values which 
section 35(5) seeks to enhance, since the admission of unreliable evidence in order 
to secure a conviction on a serious charge would unquestionably be detrimental to 
the administration of justice161 and would also impact negatively on the societal 
interest in ensuring that an accused should not be subjected to an unfair trial.162 
 
The seriousness of the charge faced by an accused is one of the important factors 
that must be considered in admissibility challenges, but it should not be allowed to 
overshadow the other factors that a court has to weigh and balance in admissibility 
challenges. It cannot be denied that society has a heightened interest in ensuring 
that those who face serious charges (and who are factually guilty) be convicted. 
Likewise, it cannot be disputed that society has a corresponding concern in 
safeguarding the constitutional rights of those accused of having allegedly committed 
the most atrocious crimes. In the light hereof it would be appropriate to assess the 
seriousness of the charges faced by the accused while having due regard to the duty 
of the courts to defend the integrity of the justice system.163 
 
So, should factual guilt tip the scales in favour of the admission of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence when such evidence is crucial for a conviction on a serious 
charge? The review of our section 35(5) jurisprudence has revealed that, by and 
large, the courts of South Africa have demonstrated firm resistance against the 
philosophy that suggests that the costs of exclusion should have an effect on their 
                                                          
161  Hogg Constitutional Law 937 expresses a similar opinion when he explores the first leg of the 
admissibility assessment. 
162  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 47, where Cromwell J reasoned as follows: "Admitting unreliable 
evidence will not serve the accused's fair trial interests nor the public's desire to uncover the 
truth." 
163  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353; S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (N) 529; R v Côté 2011 
SCC 46 para 53. 
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admissibility rulings.164 Evidence crucial for successful prosecutions on serious 
charges has in a number of cases been excluded in order to achieve the goal of 
preventing judicial contamination, while also complying with the directive of section 
35(5), that is, the prevention of disrepute befalling the administration of criminal 
justice.165 This seems to be the correct approach, since the regular excuse of 
unconstitutional police conduct because the evidence is essential for a conviction on 
serious charges would only revive the public perception (which existed before 
1994)166 that the police are above the law.167  
 
Such public perceptions may be detrimental to the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. To be sure, the regular admission of evidence obtained in blatant disregard 
of constitutional rights, which evidence is important for a conviction on serious 
charges, runs counter to two important principles: first, the "never again" principle, 
which was endorsed by the Constitutional Court as one of the fundamental tools that 
should be employed to interpret the provisions of the Bill of Rights;168 and secondly, 
the directive of section 35(5) that in challenges under section 35(5) our courts must 
defend the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
                                                          
164  See for example S v Motloutsi 1996 1 SACR 78 (C) and S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W); S v 
Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D); S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE); the majority opinion in Pillay v S 
2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA); S v Tandwa 2007 SCA 34 (RSA); S v Mthembu 2008 ZASCA 51; S v 
Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342.  
165  See the cases cited in the note immediately above. 
166  See the comments by McCall J in S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D) 531. 
167  See De Villiers (ed) TRC Report 31. 
168  Ferreira v Levine; Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 257, fn 22 of the separate but 
concurring judgment delivered by Sachs J. 
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